Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalization: Toward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform by Bach, Jonathan P
Notes
Requiring Due Care in the Process of
Patient Deinstitutionalization: Toward a
Common Law Approach to Mental
Health Care Reform
Jonathan P. Bach
Over the past three decades, many patients formerly treated in large
state mental institutions have been released or transferred to community
settings where, presumably, they are able to receive less restrictive, more
humane care.' The consequences of this process of "deinstitutionalization"
have become one of the most significant concerns of American mental
health care policy. Due to a lack of adequate community services and
facilities to accommodate the emergent, rapidly increasing outpatient pop-
ulation,2 many former patients are now located in inappropriate housing
and receiving substandard care 3-or, at the extreme, are homeless and
receiving no care at all.4 Although deinstitutionalization has often led to
1. See generally Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, SC. Ass.
Feb. 1978, at 46; Kanter, A Brief History of Deinstitutionalization, in I PROTECTION & ADVOCACY
FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELED MENTALLY ILL 79 (Mental Health Law Project ed. 1987).
2. See Community Support for Mental Patients: Hearings on Programs in the Community for
Chronically Mentally Ill Adults Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 26 (1979) (statements of
Reps. Waxman & Mikulski) [hereinafter Community Support Hearings]; GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO
Do MORE 1-8 (1977).
3. Much of the outflow has led to reinstitutionalization in nursing homes, large board and care
facilities, prisons, and jails. Goodman, Adams, & Taube, Deinstitutionalization: The Data Demythol-
ogized, 34 Host,. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129 (1983).
4. Current studies indicate that approximately 30% of the homeless are mentally ill. The mentally
ill are at high risk of becoming and remaining homeless because of their functional disabilities, and
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successful reintegration in transitional living situations or group homes,
the gaps in the system have provoked critical reassessment of the condi-
tions many patients confront upon release. In order to facilitate a more
successful process of large-scale patient release, critics of the present sys-
tem have begun to explore legal means to improve post-discharge
environments.
The possibility of pursuing legal remedies has been effectively fore-
closed at the federal level. Current interpretations of the Eleventh Amend-
ment severely limit the opportunity to bring cases against state mental
institutions in federal court.5 Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent,
unanimous decision in Youngberg v. Romeo recognized only minimal
rights of mentally disabled persons under the federal constitution.6 As a
result, state courts and legislatures have now become the principal fora for
determining the rights of the mentally ill.7 Advocates and scholars have
begun an intensive analysis of state constitutions and statutes,' and some
have begun to consider the common law.9 Common law doctrine has al-
ready been successfully employed, for example, in securing the right of
mentally ill patients to refuse treatment.1L
This Note considers the possibility of using the common law of torts to
promote reforms in the patient discharge process and in the subsequent
provision of community care. It will argue that the common law can ad-
dress some of the clearest and most significant examples of negligence that
deinstitutionalization has been perceived as one of the most significant contributors to homelessness.
See R. HAYES, THE RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 509-10 (1987); Levine & Stockdill, Mentally Ill
and Homeless: A National Problem, in TREATING THE HOMELESS: URBAN PSYCHIATRY'S CHAL-
LENGE 1-16 (B. Jones ed. 1986).
5. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment
precludes enforcement by federal court of state law against state officials); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d
79, 98 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring) ("[T]he state could release someone to whom it owed a
grave obligation, and then hide behind its eleventh amendment shield to avoid that obligation.").
6. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg, an institutionalized mentally retarded person, often put in
mechanical restraints because of his violent tendencies, brought an action through his mother against
the state. While the Court held that the patient had a right to training in basic self-care skills, it
recognized a constitutional obligation to provide only that minimum amount that would enable him to
avoid danger and unnecessary restraint. Id. at 319. Although the Court also recognized that institu-
tionalized patients maintained "liberty interests" in adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care,
safety, and freedom of movement, it recognized none of these rights as "absolute" and left their con-
tent to be determined by "professional judgment." Id. at 319-21. The implications of Youngberg have
been a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Right to Treatment in Light of
Youngberg v. Romeo, 72 GEo. L.J. 1785 (1984) (summarizing Department of Justice's narrow inter-
pretation of Youngberg and suggesting broader approach).
7. Miller, Rachlin, & Appelbaum, Patients' Rights: The Action Moves to State Courts, 38 Hosp.
& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 343 (1987); Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of
Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1249 (1987).
8. Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State Constitutions, 45 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (1982); see supra note 7.
9. See Meisel, supra note 8, at 36-39; Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of
the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1720 (1982); see also infra note 65 (discussing
current common law causes of action).
10. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner, 309 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983); Rivers v. Katz, 67
N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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arise as patients are released. Specifically, common law tort doctrine can
remedy the many instances in which patients have been discharged di-
rectly to city streets, without shelter or supervision, after the hospital has
made no significant attempt to arrange for some form of continuing com-
munity support.11 The recognition of liability in such cases would estab-
lish a doctrinal base which subsequent common law rulings could incre-
mentally extend to address other more subtle forms of abuse. Findings of
liability could also prompt further legislative action aimed toward secur-
ing a more adequate provision of community care.
Part I of this Note will briefly summarize the history of deinstitutional-
ization. Part II will argue that, in the absence of sufficient constitutional
and statutory remedies, the common law must be explored as the most
effective legal alternative available to address aspects of the transition to
community care that need to be improved. Part III will develop a common
law tort theory of negligent patient release. Part IV will consider the
range of probable legislative and institutional responses to common law
rulings that recognize governmental liability where patients have been re-
leased to inadequate environments. This Note will conclude that the com-
mon law offers a gradual but valuable means for responding to and miti-
gating some of the most significant problems that have so far prevented a
successful process of patient deinstitutionalization.
I. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: HISTORY AND CRITIQUE
With the development of antipsychotic drugs in the early 1950's and the
emergence of a humanitarian philosophy of mental illness, thousands of
patients left the confines of large state mental hospitals for the first time.12
President Kennedy succeeded in marshalling the first federal support for
community treatment alternatives through the Mental Retardation and
Community Health Centers Construction Act of 1963, which envisioned a
nationwide network of Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs).13
The specific goal of the Act was to reduce state hospital populations by
fifty percent within two decades, and federal funds were to be granted to
all CMHCs that provided several essential services. 4 Legislatures were
attracted by the fiscal efficiencies of reduced institutional treatment, and a
series of judicial decisions helped to define the constitutional basis for
what promised to be a new, enlightened form of care. 5 Between 1955 and
11. See infra note 25 (discussing negligent release to city streets).
12. See Kanter, supra note 1, at 81; Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,
Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1982).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 902(e)(2)(b), 95
Stat. 560 (1981).
14. Kanter, supra note 1, at 81-82.
15. Two of the most noted cases are Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala.) (first
recognizing right of involuntarily institutionalized patients to receive "such individual treatment as
will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition"),
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1980, the number of patients in state mental hospitals dropped from
559,000 to 132,000.6 This exodus has been termed "deinstitutionaliza-
tion." The term also refers to the discharge of individual patients.
In essence, deinstitutionalization was intended to achieve two related
yet independent goals: a decrease in inpatient populations as placement
shifted to less restrictive settings, and a corresponding increase in the pro-
vision of mental health care in the community.1 7 While the value of treat-
ing patients in less restrictive settings has continued to receive widespread
support, criticism has focused on the failure to achieve the second of these
goals, contending that state officials have yet to make deinstitutionaliza-
tion work at the community level. While hospital populations have been
rapidly depleted, community care facilities have not been developed in
numbers adequate to accommodate the massive patient release.1 Of the
2,500 planned federally supported CMHCs, fewer than 700 have been
established, serving only half the nation.' 9 The initial federal grants ex-
pired, and additional sources of revenue have not been forthcoming.2
Those funds that do exist are disproportionately allocated in favor of insti-
tutional treatment instead of community care. Despite tremendous reduc-
tions in chronic hospital populations, state hospitals continue to receive
the vast majority of state mental health budgets, with few resources left
over for community alternatives intended to serve far greater numbers of
patients.2
Where they have been established, community facilities tend to be frag-
334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 & 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part and
remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1984); and O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) ("no constitutional basis for confining [mentally ill] persons if they
are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom"); see also Rapson, The Right of the Mentally
Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 193, 203-06 (1980)
(discussing legislative and judicial developments).
16. Kanter, supra note 1, at 79.
17. See id. at 79-82.
18. Costello & Preis, Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative: A Constitutional Right to Treatment
for Mentally Disabled Persons in the Community, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1527 (1987); Rapson, supra
note 15, at 193-200; see also sources cited supra note 2.
19. 2 TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL
HEALTH 319 (1978).
20. See Kanter, Overcoming Obstacles to Housing for People Who are Mentally Disabled and
Homeless, in 2 PROTECTION & ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELED MENTALLY ILL, supra
note 1, at 955.
21. State hospitals receive more than twice the funds allocated to CMHCs under state budgets.
See Rubenstein, Access to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Severely Mentally Ill Poor People, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 382, 383-89 (special issue, summer 1986). In Texas, for example, state hospi-
tals continue to receive nearly 80% of all mental health funds, even though their populations have
been reduced by more than two thirds. Nocera, The Long, Lonesome Road, 14 TEX. MONTHLY 134,
136 (Nov. 1986). In 1965, New York State had 85,000 patients in state psychiatric facilities, but in
1979 it had only 25,000. At both times, 80% of state funds were allocated to state psychiatric facilities
as opposed to community alternatives. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUN-
CIL, FROM COUNTRY ASYLUM TO CITY STREErs: THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DEINSTITU-
TIONALIZATION AND STATE MENTAL HEALTH FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (1979); see also infra note
41 and accompanying text (discussing political factors influencing funding patterns).
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mentary and fail to integrate and coordinate their services.22 Patients find
themselves in complex urban environments where appropriate housing is
hard to find and retain. Many patients are routinely discharged to sub-
standard boarding houses and nursing homes that lack psychiatric care.23
Often, after a series of moves and displacements, their mental conditions
deteriorate and some become homeless.24 In worse cases, patients have
been released from institutions directly to city streets without written dis-
charge plans or any other provisions for shelter, supervision or basic com-
munity support.25 Proponents of deinstitutionalization are among those
most critical of the shortage of adequate facilities and services. Accord-
ingly, they have turned to legal remedies to improve the process of transi-
tion to community care.
II. THE LIMITED UTILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
ALTERNATIVES
In light of the limited rights recognized by the Supreme Court in
Youngberg and other indications that the federal judiciary will no longer
play a dominant role in overseeing patient rights, mental health advocates
have shifted their attention to constitutional and statutory provisions at the
state level.26 Constitutions and statutes are the foremost embodiments of
American law; both are superior to and may supplant or abrogate the
common law. They thus offer, at least in theory, the strongest possible
bases of reform. However, state constitutions and statutes have so far
been, and are likely to remain, very limited in their ability to address the
inadequacies in community care now confronting large numbers of the
deinstitutionalized mentally ill. This does not mean that constitutions and
statutes should be abandoned as possible sources of reform-far from it. It
means only that their weaknesses should be frankly acknowledged and
22. "[N]o agency at any level, public or private, has undertaken responsibility for coordinating
funding, treatment, and care for the chronically ill." Talbott & Sharfstein, A Proposal for Future
Funding of Chronic and Episodic Mental Illness, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1126,
1128 (1986); see Rapson, supra note 15, at 210-13.
23. Bassuk & Gerson, supra note 1, at 50; see also supra note 3 (discussing reinstitu-
tionalization).
24. Caton & Goldstein, Housing Change of Chronic Schizophrenic Patients: A Consequence of
the Revolving Door, 19 Soc. ScI. MED. 759 (1984); Bassuk & Gerson, supra note 1, at 50; see also
supra note 4 (discussing homelessness).
25. By the early 1970's, the "dumping" of patients onto the streets without any community care
at all had become a common practice. Community Support Hearings, supra note 2, at 26 (statement
of Rep. Mikulski); Reich & Segal, The Emergence of the Bowery as a Dumping Ground, 50 PsY-
CHOLoGY Q. 191 (1978); Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 384; Lawsuits Fault the Discharge of Men-
tally Ill. Assert New York Fails to Draft Follow-up Plans, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1987, at B3, col. 6.
26. See supra notes 7-8. Following the landmark decision in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), federal litigation was used increasingly as a means to achieve mental health re-
forms. However, "[it is now clear that the initial efforts to change mental health systems through
litigation at the federal level have failed." Santiago, Gittler, Beigel, Stein & Brown, Changing a State
Mental Health System Through Litigation: The Arizona Experiment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1015
(1986).
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that alternative remedies should be seriously explored as valuable supple-
ments to these principal legal tools.
A. Problems Inherent in State Constitutional Approaches
Few state constitutional decisions accord rights to the mentally ill.2" "In
many states, the use of state constitutions to enforce civil rights is a rela-
tively new phenomenon." 28 Faced with this dearth of precedent, state
courts will rely heavily on federal decisions to interpret their own consti-
tutions.29 In other words, they are likely to inherit many of the doctrinal
constraints currently preventing federal courts from undertaking a more
reformist constitutional stance.
Constitutional analysis of the rights of mentally disabled persons,
whether at the state or federal level, has been largely premised on what
courts have termed a theory of "quid pro quo."30 According to such a
theory, the government is under no obligation to provide care to disabled
persons unless it has deprived them of some fundamental right. Where a
deprivation has occurred as a result of state action, the state must provide
some benefit in return. For example, in the case of an involuntarily insti-
tutionalized mentally ill person, the government is constitutionally bound
to provide minimal treatment services in exchange for the denial of liberty
entailed by mandatory confinement. While this formulation has enabled
many courts to recognize the rights of those in confinement, 31 it has at the
same time prevented them from establishing a constitutional basis for rec-
ognizing the rights of former patients currently situated outside of institu-
tional walls where, presumably, no deprivation of liberty occurs. 32 Stan-
dard constitutional analysis, when applied at the state level, will have to
overcome this doctrinal constraint in order to yield affirmative rights in
the post-discharge environment.33
27. Perlin, supra note 7, at 1275, 1292-93.
28. Costello & Preis, supra note 18, at 1537.
29. Id.; Perlin, supra note 7, at 1275; see also Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1493-94 (1982) (state constitutional interpreta-
tion largely influenced by federal precedents).
30. Judge Becker summarized the quid pro quo theory in his concurrence in Clark v. Cohen, 794
F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986). Because the mentally disabled person, unlike the criminal, has done nothing
wrong, "involuntary commitment is therefore constitutionally problematic, and to justify it the state
must give the civilly committed persons something in exchange for their loss of liberty. . . . Habilita-
tion is the constitutionally required quid pro quo for civil confinement, hence the name of the theory."
Id. at 93-94; see also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) ("there must be a
quid pro quo extended by the government to justify confinement"), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (discussed supra note 6); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (discussed supra note 15).
32. According to Judge Becker, "it would appear that by its very nature the quid pro quo theory
supports a right to habilitation only during the time of actual civil involuntary commitment." 794
F.2d at 98 n.13 (Becker, J., concurring). Some rights may be recognized where patients have been
involuntarily committed to community settings, rather than simply released from the hospital. See
infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
33. While the quid pro quo theory provides the predominant doctrinal basis for analyzing the
constitutional rights of mentally disabled patients, it is not the only constitutional theory available for
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Constitutional doctrine has evolved to the point where some decisions
have recognized the right of patients to be committed to community resi-
dences where professional judgment deems it appropriate.3" However,
even these decisions do not constitute a departure from traditional quid
pro quo analysis. The patients remain wards of the state, with their lib-
erty constrained, regardless of whether they are physically located in a
hospital or in a community residence with similar rules.35 To this day, no
decision recognizes the constitutional right of a released, non-committed
mentally ill person to receive aftercare support in the community. In fact,
two federal circuits have held, unequivocally, that institutionalized men-
tally disabled patients have no constitutional right to placement in the
community for treatment. 6
Another difficulty involved in employing constitutional sources of law
lies in their potentially decisive impact. A constitutional decision may
override or supplant state statutes and thus confront legislatures, forcing
them to abide by judge-made law instead of allowing them to develop
their own flexible solutions to a complex problem.3" The common law
approach is in this sense more desirable than constitutional alternatives,
for it enables courts to intervene resolutely and persistently without com-
pletely overthrowing legislative discretion and priorities.3
Working with a complicated and delicate issue of first impression, state
courts will be generally reluctant to order state officials to comply with
newly articulated state constitutional rights. 9 In the absence of a clear
constitutional mandate-of a kind that does not exist-courts will hesitate
to constitutionally impose improved standards for deinstitutionalization.
determining such rights. However, other theories are less well developed and seem even less likely to
generate community treatment rights. For instance, Judge Becker discusses the alternative of a parens
patriae theory of care, according to which the state must provide the care implicit in the role of
parens (or parent) for patients it has institutionalized precisely because they are unable to care for
themselves. See id. at 94-95 (Becker, J., concurring). Yet, "the Supreme Court has not had occasion
specifically to address this theory of a state's obligations to those it commits pursuant to its parens
patriae power," and the lower federal court cases construing the theory have so far involved only the
provision of treatment within institutions. Id. at 95. Becker speculates that the right of a released
patient to obtain care in the community could be "compatible" with a parens patriae theory. Id. at 98
n.13. But no court has issued a decision that supports this view, and it seems plausible that a state
could fulfill its parens patriae duty simply by providing adequate treatment within the institution,
regardless of what befalls the patient once he or she is released.
34. See Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th
Cir. 1986).
35. See Clark, 794 F.2d at 97 (Becker, J., concurring).
36. See Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984);
Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983).
37. "Once the courts have modified or invalidated a statute on constitutional grounds, they have
done much more than act in an area of legislative inertia .... [T]heir use of constitutional adjudica-
tion makes legislative correction of their mistake impossible." G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES 11 (1982).
38. Comparing constitutional and common law, Dean Calabresi observes: "The consequence of a
wrong guess is not merely legislative revision, as in common law adjudications; a wrong guess will
entail either a constitutional amendment or the dominance of judge-made law." Id.
39. See Costello & Preis, supra note 18, at 1537.
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B. Problems Inherent in State Statutory Approaches
Statutory remedies are limited by the nature of the legislative process.
The mentally ill lack the constituency necessary to effect majoritarian re-
form.40 Moreover, powerful constituencies have organized to resist the de-
velopment of community care.4 Where statutes have been created despite
these obstacles, they often contain only vague language with no direct
mandate for the development of community services.42 In cases where stat-
utes have provided specifically for the development of comprehensive com-
munity facilities, legislative standards have been superseded by legislative
funding allocations reflecting different goals. Courts have interpreted leg-
islative failure to provide sufficient funds as evidence of legislative intent
to create a mere precatory statute, rather than a mandatory law.43
Since it is unlikely that legislatures will develop appropriate remedies,
when no influential group exists to press for their enactment, only judicial
attention offers some promise of reform. Constitutional solutions are not
forthcoming. Practically speaking, therefore, attention must be focused on
the common law as a means for courts to undertake their traditional role
40. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1315
(1976).
41. Many neighborhood groups, often referred to as NIMBY ("not in my backyard"), have or-
ganized against the creation of transitional housing for mentally ill people in their communities. See
Combatting NIMBY, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515 (1984); cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, at A26,
col. 1. (editorial on transitional housing for homeless) ("The word of the year in 1987 was probably
Nimby."). Moreover, towns and labor unions that have become financially dependent on large institu-
tions have exerted pressure to limit the transfer of funds to cities where most of the mentally ill have
gone to live. Mental Health on the Street, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at A22, col. 1 (editorial).
42. Only fourteen states have statutes that encourage or require treatment of the mentally ill in
the least restrictive environment. Only two of these create a certain entitlement to community services
or deinstitutionalization. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10-101(a)-(b) (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
51.61(1)(e) (West 1987). The District of Columbia created a similar entitlement by judicial interpre-
tation. See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D.D.C. 1975). Georgia makes it state policy
to secure the least restrictive alternative placement. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-161 (1982). Six of the
fourteen provide an indeterminate right to treatment in the least restrictive setting. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.30.655(2) (1984); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 5325.1(a) (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
91 2, para. 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3601-06 (Supp. 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115.1(10) (Vernon 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7102 (Purdon Supp.
1988). Hawaii and Vermont both support deinstitutionalization or community services indirectly. See
HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-35(1), (3) (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7703 (1987). Massachusetts
and Minnesota have a procedure for reviewing alternatives to hospitalization. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123, § 4(3) (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(1) (West Supp. 1988).
Thirty-six states lack a statutory framework acknowledging a right to mental health treatment in the
least restrictive available setting for mentally ill patients. See generally S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B.
WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 626-28 (1985) (describing statutory
frameworks). New York law requires that the released patient be provided a written discharge plan.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §24.15 (g) (McKinney 1988).
43. See, e.g., Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1450, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1986) (statutory scheme indicated only legislative preference for community-based treatment, not
mandatory right, because state mental health budget was not substantially increased at time legislation
was enacted) (opinion ordered unpublished, Mar. 5, 1987); cf Rodgers v. Gibson, 218 N.J. Super.
452, 528 A.2d 43, 46 (1987) (despite apparent mandate of existing laws, programs for homeless
presently not adequately funded).
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in protecting individual rights and in urging greater responsiveness on the
part of government and community bodies.
III. A COMMON LAW THEORY OF NEGLIGENT PATIENT RELEASE
Common law courts have sufficient authority and doctrine to counter-
balance constituencies that favor the status quo. The doctrinal basis of
their authority lies both in fundamental tort law and in specific precedents
in medical malpractice and the mental health care field. One of the most
important features of the common law approach that distinguishes it from
other legal alternatives is that it recognizes a continuing duty of care that
extends beyond the technical termination of the patient's institutional stay
and accompanies his or her return to the community. This duty could be
employed as an effective legal means for refining the process of deinstitu-
tionalization and for guaranteeing better access to community care.
A. Fundamental Tort Doctrine
"It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratui-
tously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he
acts at all.""" Thus, for example, a good samaritan, though not initially
obligated to render aid, becomes liable for negligence once the provision of
aid is undertaken.45 Similarly, a landlord who voluntarily performs re-
pairs not required by law will be held responsible for injuries resulting
from his failure to proceed with due care."' Insofar as an actor fails to
meet the standard of due care, his or her conduct may be deemed tortious.
Case law has firmly established that the standard of due care is
breached whenever a provider of aid exposes a recipient of aid to reasona-
bly foreseeable harm. Thus, the Restatement of Torts explains: "If the
actor has succeeded in removing the other from a position of danger to one
of safety, he cannot change his position for the worse by unreasonably
putting him back into the same peril, or into a new one."'47 This aspect of
due care underlines the continuous nature of the responsibility.48 The pro-
44. Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233 N.Y. 236, 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922) (Cardozo, J.).
45. See, e.g., Devlin v. Safeway Stores, 235 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (slip victim negligently
escorted home); cf. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[I]f you do begin
to rescue someone you must complete the rescue in a nonnegligent fashion even though you had no
duty of rescue in the first place.").
46. See, e.g., Conner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963); see
also infra note 47 (discussing similar case).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 comment g (1965); cf Marks v. Nambil Realty
Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 259, 157 N.E. 129, 130 (1927):
The tenant does not have to prove that by the negligent making of the repairs what was wrong
has been made worse. His case is made out when it appears that by reason of such negligence
what was wrong is still wrong, though prudence would have made it right .... [T]he pres-
ence of the prop cloaked the defect, dulled the call to vigilance, and so aggravated the danger.
48. Of course, the responsibility is not infinitely continuous, thereby obligating the gratuitous
provider of aid to an unreasonable length of good conduct. Instead, what is required is that a provider
of gratuitous, direct aid make a reasonable attempt to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm.
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vider of aid is legally barred from simply abandoning the recipient; in-
stead, the circumstances of release must be considered along with their
potential prospective effect on the recipient being released.49 This princi-
ple has been articulated in many varied areas of the law, including cases
involving train safety,5  police conduct,"1 and medical malpractice.1
2
B. Application
In the context of deinstitutionalization, the fundamental claim suggested
by the common law is that the state has a duty to proceed with due care
in the process of patient discharge. The state assumes this duty once it
institutionalizes a patient and thereby commences a relationship of aid. 3
49. See, e.g., Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1977) (issue of negligence where drunkard taken into police custody was eventually released to aban-
doned golf course near busy thruway).
50. In Haug v. Great N. Ry. Co., 8 N.D. 23, 27, 77 N.W. 97, 99 (1898), the North Dakota
Supreme Court observed:
When the carrier discovers that one helpless from intoxication is upon its train without right,
it must, in selecting a safe place to put him off, have regard to his actual condition, physical
and mental. . . .The law declares to the carrier that it shall not expose him to great peril,
even in exercising its undoubted right to eject him; and, in declaring whether he will be sub-
jected to peril, not only must climatic conditions, the propinquity of shelter, and other matters
be taken into account, but also the actual state of his mind and bodily health and strength, if
known to the agent of the carrier.
See also Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Marrs' Adm'x, 119 Ky. 913, 85 S.W. 188 (1905) (de-
fendant railroad company obliged to see drunk left by another railroad safely out of yard).
51. E.g., Iglesias v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Ind. App. 1982):
[Tihe case at bar presents a unique question of law because [previous cases] involved situations
where the injured prisoners were in the supervising authority's custody when their injuries
occurred. Iglesias's injuries occurred after he was released from Sheriff Wells' custody and he
argues his injuries were caused by the circumstances of his release. There is little law on this
point; however, the authorities which are available lead us to conclude that under some cir-
cumstances [here, adverse weather conditions] the Sheriff would owe Iglesias a duty to release
him in a manner which would not subject him to unreasonable danger.
See also Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 86-89, 154 N.E.2d 534, 541-42, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265, 274-76 (1958) (McNally, J., concurring) (state's assumption of relationship with voluntary po-
lice informant carries with it obligation to exercise reasonable prudence with regard to foreseeable
risks); supra note 49.
52. Medical malpractice has long recognized the tort of "abandonment," a cessation of treatment
already underway, including failure to provide follow-up services outside of the hospital when neces-
sary. See, e.g., Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1954) (physician held negligent for discharging
lip cancer patient without providing for further medical attention); Fausette v. Grim, 193 Mo. App.
585, 186 S.W. 1177 (1916) (patient released from hospital with postoperative insanity later became
violently insane due to excitement and disturbance upon release); Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489,
68 P.2d 1034 (1937) (surgeon held liable for discharging patient with lower bowel condition and then
ceasing to treat plaintiff after he had returned home); infra notes 53, 57-58 (discussing additional
cases); Hospitals Expanding Procedures to Assist Patients for Discharge, N. Y. Times, Feb. 11,
1988, at B9, col. 1. (summarizing statement by Society for Hospital Social Work Directors):
[Ilf a patient is discharged with a wound that requires regular cleaning and dressing but the
hospital makes no arrangements for follow-up care, it might be held legally responsible for
negligent discharge if the patient develops an infection ....
"The hospital has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a discharged patient from dan-
gers which are reasonably foreseeable." [lawyers' monograph].
See generally Annotation, Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R.2D 432 (1958 &
Supps. 1984, 1988) (collecting cases).
53. See, e.g., St. George v. State, 203 Misc. 340, 349, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596, 604 ("The State, having
assumed to care for and treat a mental incompetent confined to its care . . was obliged to exercise a
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The absence of a direct constitutional or statutory mandate simply implies
that the state has no original affirmative obligation to provide minimally
adequate discharge planning and an acceptable aftercare environment.54
However, once the state does commence a relationship with the patient, it
becomes-like the good samaritan-bound by the duty to proceed with
due care.
The state tortiously breaches this duty whenever its institutions expose
their patients to reasonably foreseeable harm.55 Such a tort arises where
the state, after having undertaken to provide aid to the patient, simply
abandons him or her upon discharge, without regard to the conditions the
patient is likely to encounter in the post-discharge environment. The same
tort occurs even in those cases where patient release is mandated by stat-
ute: Any instance of release-whether or not required by law-may not
be conducted unreasonably, and may be deemed tortious insofar as it vio-
lates basic standards of care.56
These principles have been applied previously in cases involving physi-
cian and hospital liability as well as mental health practice. Medical mal-
practice has traditionally included a tort of "abandonment" where services
commenced have been discontinued, or where necessary follow-up care
reasonable degree of care."), rev'd on other grounds, 283 A.D. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, affd, 308
N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1953). The duty to proceed with due care may be triggered by even the
slightest undertaking on the part of the provider of aid. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d
575 (Fla. 1958) (by virtue of cursory preliminary examination, after which hospital decided it was not
necessary to admit patient, hospital became subject to duty of due care which it breached by releasing
patient); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (where receiving
nurse refused to admit patient but telephoned for help elsewhere, such brief contact was sufficient to
create issue of negligence).
54. Youngberg states that "[a]s a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services for those within its border." 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
55. Studies have indicated that an unstructured release without referral to a community aftercare
or transitional service will result in a predictable and substantial increase in the rate of reinstitutional-
ization. See H. FREEMAN & 0. SIMMONS, THE MENTAL PATIENT COMES HOME (1963); Zolik,
Lance & Sommers, Hospital Return Rates and Pre-Release Referrals, 18 ARCHVES GEN. PSYCHIA-TRY 712 (1968).
Mentally ill patients are exposed to reasonably foreseeable harm whenever they are released to
unstructured, unsupervised, shelterless environments where their condition will usually deteriorate.
See J. TALBOTr, THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1984); ef. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 211,
502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 728 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 713, 497 N.E.2d 679, 506
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1986) (denial of appropriate emergency shelter to homeless families constitutes irrepa-
rable injury). Where individuals have been released to foreseeably dangerous circumstances, the act of
release itself, rather than the mental or physical state of the individual or the conditions of the release
environment, has been held to be the proximate cause of the injuries that ensue. Parvi v. City of
Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d at 560, 362 N.E.2d at 965, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 166; see also infra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text (discussing other cases where act of release established tort liability).
56. The statutory obligation to release a patient does not trump the common law obligation to
undertake such a release with due care. Rather, these two aspects of the law should complement each
other to make sure both that 1) discharge takes place, pursuant to the statute, and that 2) it takes
place in a safe and responsible way, pursuant to the requirements of due care.
It should be stressed, moreover, that the statutory framework providing for mandatory release of
capable patients was developed as part of an entire project. The rationale behind deinstitutionalization
was not simply that patients should be released, but that they should be released to suitable forms of
community care. In that sense, the intention of the release statutes coincides with the common law
goal to ensure that follow-up services are provided in the post-discharge environment.
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has not been provided.57 Moreover, negligence has similarly been estab-
lished where state psychiatric hospitals have released potentially unstable
individuals to unsupervised, unstructured environments where they have
caused injury to themselves or to others.5" Together, these cases lay the
conceptual and precedential foundation necessary to extend the applica-
tion of fundamental tort principles to the situation of negligent patient
release,59 where the reasonably foreseeable harm is mental and physical
deterioration due to inadequate discharge planning and a lack of commu-
nity resources.60
The patient release process is complex, and the specific parameters of
due care are difficult to define in the abstract without a trial process.
However, in the clearest and most significant cases of negligence-such as
where hospitals have made no reasonable attempt to locate and arrange
some form of community aftercare services prior to a patient's discharge,
but instead have simply released the patient directly to city streets-the
common law can be most effective in recognizing violations of due care.61
Such cases should therefore provide a starting point for advocates and
57. See supra note 52 (discussing abandonment); see also, e.g., Le Jeune Road Hosp. v. Watson,
171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (quoting HEALTH LAW CENrER OF THE UNIVERSrrY OF
PITTSBURGH, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL (1960)) ("Once a hospital begins to treat a person, it must
not act unreasonably in having him removed from the premises. . . . if it is foreseeable that his
condition will be aggravated or his danger increased by removal."); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn.
144, 158, 179 N.W.2d 288, 298 (1970) (citing and affirming lower court) ("psychiatrist who dis-
charges from hospitalization a patient . . . is obligated to take . . . reasonable precautions . . . to
obviate or minimize the patient suffering harm after discharge because he was not prepared or compe-
tent to care for himself or because suitable arrangements had not been made to provide proper contin-
ued care for him.").
58. See, e.g., Bell v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 A.D.2d 270, 456 N.Y.S.2d 787
(1982) (citing numerous authorities where claims of psychiatric malpractice have involved nature of
decision to release, court held state psychiatric hospital liable for negligent release of patient who
attempted suicide); Comiskey v. State, 71 A.D.2d 699, 418 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1979) (involving patient
suicide) ("[T]he State . . . is required to exercise reasonable care in . . . supervising and protecting
mentally deficient persons to prevent injury to themselves and others.").
59. In a related article, working solely with New York law, one commentator has suggested that
funds to build shelters for the homeless could be generated by suing institutions for faulty medical
treatment provided to deinstitutionalized homeless during their stays in institutions, including the mal-
practice tort of premature discharge. Note, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50
BROOKLYN L. REV. 939, 984-94 (1984). What must be stressed, however, is the type of activity that
takes place at the point when discharge is mature-whether adequate discharge planning takes place,
whether a significant effort is made to locate and arrange for some form of community follow-up and
supervision.
60. Similar principles are implied in justice Blackmun's concurrence in Youngberg. He speculates
that it may be
necessary to prevent a person's pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of his
commitment. . . . If a person could demonstrate that he entered a state institution with mini-
mal self-care skills, but lost those skills after commitment because of the State's unreasonable
refusal to provide him training, then, it seems to me, he has alleged a loss of liberty. . ..
457 U.S. at 327. This logic can be extended to suggest that a state must undertake similar efforts to
prevent the patient from deteriorating upon release. Of course, justice Blackmun's argument is based
on constitutional doctrine; it is limited to preventing deterioration only within the institutional setting.
One must turn to the common law to make a similar argument about deterioration after discharge.
61. See supra note 25 (discussing instances of such abuse), note 55 (discussing harm).
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courts, leaving other less apparent instances of negligence for subsequent
decisions once basic principles and doctrine have been established.
It should be stressed that, even where patients are not simply aban-
doned, but instead are provided the minimal resources that patients more
typically receive-such as medications, instructions for their use, and a list
of possible housing alternatives-there is still no guarantee that an unsta-
ble patient will adhere to the medical regimen or succeed in finding an
appropriate residence.62 Therefore, what is ultimately needed to make a
policy of deinstitutionalization efficacious is a network of outreach services
and community aftercare facilities that make consistent attempts to main-
tain contact with released patients and to provide some structure for their
treatment outside of institutional walls. Theoretically, negligence could be
broadly ascribed to all instances where these services are lacking, for in
such cases state actors release those for whom they have become responsi-
ble to situations that, absent necessary safeguards, expose dischargees to
foreseeable harm. However, such a concept of negligence may be too
broad for courts to apply in the first instance without raising questions of
judicial legitimacy. Thus, this Note advocates taking as a starting point
only those situations in which not even minimal or nominal aid has been
provided to patients being released. However, it is toward this broader
conception of negligence that the common law must over time mature.
Since the state employs the doctors and staff involved in the discharge
process at state psychiatric institutions, advocates representing mentally ill
persons could bring causes of action for negligent patient release against
the state through respondeat superior.63 As a threshold matter, each suit
will depend on the extent to which the state involved has immunized itself
and its agencies against tort."' Suits could be brought either on behalf of
62. Cf Kanter, supra note 1, at 81; Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 386 n.45 (low income patients
often provided only medication and evaluation).
63. Since the state is responsible for overseeing the overall provision and delivery of mental health
care services, it is more practical from the point of view of reform to bring suits against the state itself
rather than against individual doctors. One traditional legal means for bringing such suits is respon-
deat superior. Cf Morell v. Balasubramanian, 70 N.Y.2d 297, 301, 514 N.E.2d 1101, 1102, 520
N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (1987) ("A suit against a State officer will be held to be one which is really
asserted against the State when it arises from actions or determination of the officer made in his or her
official role and involves rights asserted . . . solely against the State."). For examples of liability
imposed on state actors, see Maroon v. State, 411 N.E.2d 404, 417 (Ind. App. 1980) (state not im-
mune from liability for damage caused by escapee of state mental hospital); Austin W. Jones Co. v.
State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923) (state held liable under respondeat superior where negligently
released mental patient set plaintiff's property ablaze); State v. Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 470 A.2d
869 (1983) (sovereign immunity does not bar suit for wrongful discharge of psychiatric patient); see
also supra notes 53, 58, infra note 75 (discussing cases brought against state mental hospitals).
64. The movement away from immunity and toward governmental accountability has accelerated
in this century with the passage of state and federal tort claims acts. All but a few states have either
totally or partially abolished their sovereign immunity. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JUDICIAL
REVIEW-AGENCY ACTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6121. Although many states continue to protect themselves from lia-
bility in the performance of judicial and legislative functions, usually certain ministerial acts, as op-
posed to basic policy and planning decisions, will not fall within the grant of immunity covering
official action. See, e.g., Bellavance v. State, 390 So. 2d 422 (Fla. App. 1980) (applying this principle
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released patients who have been provided with no aftercare plans, or on
behalf of institutionalized patients soon to be released where there are
indications that only inadequate community facilities are available.65
Difficult situations may arise where voluntary inpatients request and
insist upon release even after doctors have apprised them of limited com-
munity resources and of the significant dangers posed by inadequate dis-
charge environments.8 6 Can the state be held liable once the decision to be
discharged has been made by the patient, fully aware of the options, exer-
cising what amounts to an "informed consent" ?67 Presenting the patient
with a Hobson's choice between institutional confinement and squalid
homelessness should not shield the state and its actors from charges of
negligence. Released patients, even those who have presumably "con-
sented" to their release, should maintain the right to sue when the legally
required release fails to conform to a standard of due care.6" Once the
in context of release of mental patient).
65. Suits aimed toward equitable or prospective relief would probably be most effective in terms
of generating new structures and mechanisms to guarantee the provision of adequate mental health
care services in the community.
A common law cause of action was brought by the Coalition for the Homeless, on behalf of dis-
chargees from state psychiatric care facilities, against the governor of New York. Klostermann v.
Cuomo, 126 Misc.2d 247, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1984). In addition to statutory and constitutional
claims, Count VII of the complaint charged defendants with violating "their common law duty to
provide state hospital patients with reasonable care and to protect them from reasonably foreseeable
harm." 126 Misc. 2d at 260, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 585. The Supreme Court of New York County dealt
only briefly with this claim, since it denied jurisdiction. Id. However, Judge Wallach did cite two
cases to suggest that similar claims had been rejected in the past: Riss v. City of New York, 22
N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); and Perazzo v. Lindsay, 23 N.Y.2d 764, 244
N.E.2d 471, 296 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1968). The Court's analysis addressed none of the mental health
cases discussed in this Note, and the only authorities it did cite were inapposite; neither Riss nor
Perazzo discusses the standard of care owed by public officials to mentally disabled persons under
their care and custody.
66. Voluntary patients must usually request release through written applications. In some states,
statutes permit the institution to detain the patient for several days. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394.465(2)(a) (West 1973 & Supp. 1981) (three days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A § 73 (West 1979)
(ten days), recodified at 43A §§ 7-101 to 7-102 (Supp. 1988). One reason for this detention, aside
from allowing the patient to change his mind or allowing the hospital to commence involuntary com-
mitment proceedings, is to provide the staff with an opportunity to negotiate for some transitional care
or aftercare in the community. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 42, at 185.
67. The patient's release decision will often fail short of the paradigm required by informed con-
sent. When one alternative presented to the patient is prolonged institutionalization, the patient can-
not be described as making a free choice among proper medical alternatives. Rather, the patient is
responding to the threat of coercion raised by the prospect of further confinement. Cf. Friedman,
Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L.
REv. 39, 82 (1975) (describing confinement as variable that affects voluntariness of person's acts).
Arguably, this coercive influence renders meaningless the concept of consent.
A state's retreat to a doctrine of informed consent would, to some extent, be bitterly ironic. In other
areas of mental health practice, states have only begrudgingly recognized the right of patients to deter-
mine the course of their own treatment. In establishing the right of patients to refuse medication, for
example, the battle to adopt a doctrine of consent has been particularly hard-fought. See Brooks, Right
to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and Policy, 39 RuTGERS L. REV. 339 (1987); see also
supra note 10 (discussing related case law).
68. The signing of "voluntary" release forms is not tantamount to signing a waiver of one's legal
rights to sue in tort. Courts have upheld the claims of mental patients and their families who have
sued for negligent release. See, e.g., Poss v. Georgia Regional Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Ga.
1987) (where suicidal patient killed himself after discharge, hospital held liable despite various claims
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state has assumed a duty of care, it may not exercise total latitude in
meeting the patient's release request, but must provide meaningful and
medically acceptable alternatives for those patients who seek relocation in
community settings. 9
The Supreme Court implicitly encouraged this shift away from consti-
tutional adjudication and toward a common law approach in Youngberg.
Although the Court set out to determine the rights of institutionalized pa-
tients under the Fourteenth Amendment,7" it ultimately deferred to "pro-
fessional judgment" to determine the content of those rights. 1 In holding
that the "proper standard for determining whether a State adequately has
protected [mental patients'] rights" turns on whether a "professionally ac-
ceptable" medical choice has been made,7 2 the Court tacitly adopted a tort
law conceptualization of the rights of mentally disabled patients.7 3
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
While common law rulings provide a concrete remedy to those who
seek judicial redress, their long-term significance lies in their ability to
provide an impetus for reform to be carried out through other branches of
government. In order to develop a sense of the consequences of using the
common law in the context of deinstitutionalization, it is important to con-
sider the range of probable legislative and institutional responses to com-
of sovereign and governmental immunity); Bell v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 A.D.2d
787, 456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1982) (psychiatric hospital held liable for negligence where released patient
attempted suicide). Other cases have denied the right of doctors and hospitals to contract against
negligence. See Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
69. "Since discharges to inadequate environments often trigger relapses, and since accepted medi-
cal practice today is to move the patient gradually from a more structured environment to a less
restrictive one, appropriate treatment should include aftercare in the community." Rhoden, supra
note 12, at 421. The revision of state mental health codes in the 1970's has made it clear that, even
though community facilities are lacking, many states at least recognize the importance of least restric-
tive placement. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 42, at 266. Common law courts,
experienced in discerning and applying the concepts prevalent in the existing legal topography, can
prompt the states to take seriously their latent commitment to meeting the demands of accepted medi-
cal practice.
70. 457 U.S. 307, 314 (1982).
71. Observing that "interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these
institutions should be minimized," the Court limited the role of judicial review to determining
whether in fact an acceptable professional judgment had been made. Where such judgments have been
made, patients' liberty interests under the constitution have not been infringed. 457 U.S. at 321-23.
72. Id. at 321. "Liability may be imposed only" for "substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice or standards." Id. at 323.
73. Indeed, Chief Judge Seitz, in his concurrence in the court of appeals case, tellingly observed:
Distinguishing constitutional violations from ordinary malpractice claims is especially difficult
in the present case .... [W]ith respect to the institutionalization of the developmentally dis-
abled, the Constitution only establishes minimum standards below which the state's conduct
may not fall. Although common-law tort principles may provide a useful starting point in
formulating the appropriate standard of care ... they cannot be determinative of the constitu-
tional issue.
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), vacated and
remanded 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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mon law adjudications involving patient discharge. Major issues to be con-
sidered include the extent to which common law remedies can be pursued
effectively in light of the possibility of statutory reinstatement of immunity
and in light of possible adverse effects on institutional process.
A. Statutory Immunity
A legislature opposed to the application of common law tort standards
in the context of patient release could respond strongly by creating statu-
tory immunity for state doctors and hospitals involved in the discharge
process. A grant of total immunity, for example, could severely undercut
the practical objectives of common law rulings.
There are, however, legal and practical restraints that reduce the capac-
ity of legislatures to respond in such a peremptory way. As a general rule,
legislatures may not abrogate common law rights without providing for
some alternative means of remedy through statute. This principle is em-
bodied in the "right to remedy" clauses of many state constitutions, 4
which make it unconstitutional to abolish completely a common law right.
Courts have persistently enforced right to remedy clauses in responding to
legislative attempts to limit the possibility of judicial redress. 5 In turn,
legislatures have sought to avoid constitutional impasses either by creating
alternative statutory remedies or by enacting statutes that provide for only
qualified, rather than total, immunity-preserving the possibility of judi-
cial redress in those cases where negligence is most apparent.7
74. The various "right to remedy" provisions range from ARiz. CONST. art. 18, § 6: "The right of
action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be
subject to any statutory limitation"; to the more broadly worded ILL. CONST. art I, § 12: "Every
person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive
. ... "; see also, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art.
11; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 11. For further examples from other states, see
cases cited infra notes 75-76.
75. See, e.g., Stewart v. Houk, 127 Or. 589, 271 P. 998 (1928) (statute removing tort liability of
automobile drivers to gratuitous guests held unconstitutional violation of right to remedy clause);
Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955) (city ordinance abrogating mu-
nicipal liabilities for injuries sustained on streets and sidewalks unconstitutional); see also Note,
Torts-North Carolina's "Good Samaritan" Statute, 44 N.C.L. Rgv. 508 (1966) (considering con-
stitutionality of statute granting immunity).
For a case concerning doctor and hospital liability, see State v. Brosseau, 124 N.H. 184, 197, 470
A.2d 869, 876-79 (1983) (special concurrence) (right to remedy clause would render immunity un-
constitutional in context of four consolidated claims involving mental health practice, including one for
negligent release); see also Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964) [hereinafter "Note, Good Samaritans"].
Any attempt to abrogate the right to sue for malpractice will in all likelihood be struck down
in many jurisdictions . . . . Total immunity for doctors might be struck down as unconstitu-
tional, particularly in states with a right to a remedy provision; moreover, even if sustained,
immunization could very well fail to secure the desired objective.
Id. at 1315-21 (citations omitted).
76. See, e.g., Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W.2d 961 (1937) (limiting right of guest
passengers to recover from driver to cases where driver's conduct was wanton and willfull); see also
Note, Good Samaritans, supra note 75, at 1308 (statutory grants of immunity are invariably quali-
fied for good samaritans).
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The particular legislative response will depend, to a large extent, on the
degree to which courts are willing to recognize negligence in various as-
pects of the patient discharge process. Where courts proceed incre-
mentally, as the unique methodology of the common law demands, begin-
ning by recognizing liability only with regard to the clearest and most
significant examples of negligence, legislatures will be less likely to re-
spond defensively and more likely to concede that flagrant violations
should be deterred by judicial means.
B. Effects on Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization
A different legislative or institutional response would be to avoid liabil-
ity from the outset by passing statutes and guidelines that limit the initial
admission of patients to state psychiatric facilities. In other words, the
threat of common law rulings against the state could result in reduced
access to institutional care. This possibility, while serious, poses only a
slightly greater threat to patients than the status quo. Currently, the lack
of sufficient aftercare and community facilities severely curtails whatever
benefits accrue from the initial, usually brief institutional stay.77 Hospitals
release many patients to unstructured environments where their mental
conditions deteriorate until they require reinstitutionalization, after which
they are then released again-the familiar syndrome of the "revolving
door.'"7 8 Judicial pressure, generated through the common law, is neces-
sary to achieve reforms in the post-discharge environment, so that ulti-
mately the benefits of institutionalization, rather than dissipating soon af-
ter release, will endure as patients return to less restrictive settings.79
Alternatively, legislatures and institutions could respond to the threat of
tort liability by enacting statutes and guidelines that restrict patient dis-
charge. Such a response would create short-term disequilibria in the insti-
tutional setting, prolonging hospital stays for current patient populations,
thereby decelerating deinstitutionalization until necessary reforms occur at
the community level. The prospect of this response raises serious dilem-
mas for a society concerned both with liberty and with the right of indi-
viduals to be afforded reasonable care. Neither alternative-continued re-
lease to inadequate environments or decelerated deinstitutionalization-is
completely satisfactory. The common law, like its constitutional and statu-
tory alternatives, cannot neatly avoid this Scylla and Charybdis of the
mental health field.
Although this tension can never be averted absolutely, several factors
will combine to mitigate the propensity of legislatures to respond by im-
77. See supra note 55 and text accompanying notes 18-25.
78. See Caton & Goldstein, supra note 24; Solomon, Davis & Gordon, Discharged State Hospital
Patients' Characteristics and Use of Aftercare: Effect on Community Tenure, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TR 1566 (1984).
79. See Solomon, Davis & Gordon, supra note 78.
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posing unnecessarily restrictive guidelines on the discharge process. First,
the judiciary is likely to exercise its own independent controls to curtail
unwarranted liability. For instance, as has been the rule in prior cases
involving wrongful release, courts will generally not impose liability
where there have been honest errors of professional judgment, but only
where the professional made no reasonable attempt to effect a proper re-
lease.80 Secondly, courts may tailor remedies in favor of prospective and
equitable relief as opposed to compensatory damages. Without the finan-
cial risk of heavy tort liability, institutions may be less likely to react de-
fensively by unnecessarily prolonging patient stays.
Finally, because community care is often less expensive than institu-
tional alternatives, it will be fiscally more efficient for legislatures in many
jurisdictions to avoid liability by creating increased community services
rather than by restricting institutional discharge.8' In many states, the re-
sources necessary to develop more substantial community alternatives
could be effectively obtained through a reallocation of existing mental
health funds.82 In these areas, common law rulings should generate a
more cooperative legislative response.
C. Legislative Accommodation and the Role of Common Law Courts
Some state legislatures will respond to common law rulings by accom-
modating judicial concerns and by attempting to cooperate in achieving a
more satisfactory provision of community care. This has already been the
result of one recent litigation where an effort was made to stress basic
requirements and principles of "care" rather than specific statutory man-
dates. 83 While the ultimate goal of a common law court may be to obtain
80. See, e.g., Cohen v. State, 51 A.D.2d 494, 497, 382 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (1976) (hospital held
liable for release of suicidal individual where negligence constituted "more than an error of medical
judgment"); Homere v. State, 48 A.D.2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975) (state hospital liable for
release of violent patient where more than honest error of judgment).
81. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 5-6 (citing seven studies comparing
costs of institutional and community care, including HEW study that found average net savings over
ten-year period of $20,800 per person for community care); MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE, RESIDENTIAL CARE STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 38, 88-91, 104 (1979) (community
residential and support programs could save state between one and two million dollars per year).
82. See supra note 21 (discussing disproportionate resource allocation), note 41 (discussing politi-
cal pressures resisting reallocation). Louisiana recently reallocated its funds from institutional to com-
munity alternatives. See Deiher, How to Ensure That the Money Follows the Patient: A Strategy for
Funding Community Services, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 256 (1986).
83. A new litigation strategy was developed for an action on behalf of mentally disabled individu-
als in Arizona, claiming that they were entitled to a full continuum of coordinated community mental
health services. The approach drew from state statutory provisions but emphasized remedies based on
broad "principles of care" rather than specific prescriptions. See Arnold v. Sam, No. C 432435 (Ariz.
Super. Ct., Jun. 24, 1985), appeal docketed, No. ICA-CIV 9262 (Ariz. Ct. App., Oct. 3, 1986).
Accordingly, a court order was issued requiring the state hospital to ensure that discharged patients
had a place to live and an adequate program for necessary treatment. The executive and legislative
branches have joined the judiciary's efforts to address the inadequacies in Arizona's system of care.
Specifically, the legislature has shown a willingness to increase the level of funding. See Santiago,
Gittler, Beigel, Stein & Brown, supra note 26.
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this form of salutary legislative response, there is still a value in common
law rulings even where such complete cooperation cannot be anticipated
as an immediate or inevitable result. Common law rulings, even when
rejected by the legislature and challenged by contrary statutes, at least
retain the valuable effect of articulating individual demands and identify-
ing social goals.8 Individuals and politically ineffective groups have tradi-
tionally had recourse to the courts where majoritarian bodies have either
violated or ignored their concerns." These concerns, once articulated by
the judiciary, often require of the legislature additional consideration and
response.88
While constitutional decisions have at times transformed entire bodies
of law and effected major social change, common law rulings have the
advantage of providing a forum for the fair hearing of minoritarian de-
mands without jeopardizing the flexibility of the legislature to respond in
ways that reflect its own concerns."' Common law courts develop stan-
dards gradually, as precedents are tentatively and cautiously extended
over time."' They may begin with de minimis standards, insisting upon
legislative recognition of minimal norms. Then, once courts and legisla-
tures have arrived at mutual accommodation, future decisions may suggest
reevaluation aimed at higher goals. At each stage, the common law prods
the legislature, incrementally, inviting it either to acquiesce in the court's
judgment or to insist again on minimal norms through contrary statutes.89
In this manner, the common law court maintains an impact on legislative
agendas, and both branches are able to play complementary roles in work-
84. "The mentally ill, whether in a State institution or previously institutionalized and now
homeless in New York City, are entitled to a declaration of their rights as against the State ...
[T]he judiciary is empowered to declare the individual rights in all such cases." Klostermann v.
Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 530-31, 463 N.E.2d 588, 590, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249 (1984).
85. "[T]he judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved." Chayes, supra note 40, at
1308. "[O]ne may ask whether democratic theory really requires deference to majoritarian outcomes
whose victims are. . . inmates of mental institutions. . . .Unlike the numerical minorities that the
courts protected . . . these have no alternative access to the levers of power in the system." Id. at
1315.
86. One function of common law courts is at times to "do no more than create a situation in
which conscious legislative reconsideration of the law [is] made likely." G. CALABRESI, supra note 37,
at 2. Common law provides a means to "allocate the burden of [legislative] inertia" by having courts
suggest when legislatures should take a "second look." Id. at 146-66.
87. Professor Robert A. Burt has explained:
[T]he implications of initial decisions become clear and are shaped and reshaped over
time. . . .This is not a methodological weakness, a regrettable inefficiency in [the] common
law. . . this time-consuming tentativeness is the legitimizing heart of these adjudicatory meth-
ods. This methodology is essential for achieving the deliberate, self-consciously reflective pro-
cess of social aggregation that offers the best prospect of preserving individuals' inviolable in-
tegrity within that aggregation and protecting judges against imposing on others their merely
idiosyncratic, socially isolated visions of aggregating principles.
Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 265, 356-57 (R. Mnookin ed.
1985).
88. See id.
89. "Judicial participation is not by way of sweeping and immutable statements of the law, but in
the form of a continuous and rather tentative dialogue with other political elements." Chayes, supra
note 40, at 1316.
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ing with complex aspects of the law. Reform is achieved gradually, as
interstitial advances cumulate over time.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of judicial intervention through the common law merits
further attention as a potential means of achieving the mutual goals of
widespread patient release and the provision of sufficient aftercare services
in the community90 Common law courts may promote reforms in the pro-
cess of patient discharge and in the subsequent transition to community
care by requiring state hospitals and actors to conform to a basic standard
of due care. Fundamental principles of duty and care will ultimately en-
able the judiciary to consider aspects of deinstitutionalization that have yet
to be sufficiently addressed under other, traditionally stronger forms of
law. The common law, like its statutory and constitutional alternatives,
cannot be counted on as a panacea. Instead, it offers at best only a gradual
means for the interstitial development of social norms, in part vulnerable
to statutory abrogation and other forms of legislative control. Nevertheless,
a disciplined application of common law standards in the patient dis-
charge process may enable courts to achieve improved levels of mental
health care practice, gradually, without significantly challenging legisla-
tive authority and flexibility in the context of a difficult and enduring
problem.
90. The idea of employing common law models, especially in areas of law that have come to be
dominated almost exclusively by statutes, has been increasingly suggested by recent scholarship. The
theoretical foundations for such an approach have been spelled out in Dean Calabresi's A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTEs. G. CALABRESI, supra note 37. However, Calabresi is primarily
concerned with providing a justification for courts to take on an essentially legislative role; his discus-
sion of judicial revision of obsolete statutes is geared toward reconciling judicial action with
majoritarian concerns. See, e.g., id. at 92-94 (discussing potential countermajoritarian problems posed
by common law courts). This Note suggests that the legitimacy of common law courts also stems from
the heightened necessity of representing minoritarian concerns in a legal framework increasingly dom-
inated by statutes and other majoritarian forms of law.
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